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CASES NOTED

collision of his aircraft with another. The owner's direct control is
immaterial. 9 However, the owner's consent to the operation is necessary.' 0
The instant case has precedent for applying the automobile law to
that of airplane collision." Precedent is also to be found for denoting
the airplane a dangerous instrumentality.' 2 However, it is suggested that
the result is a compilation of nonsense' 3 and that the reasoned, logical
view is that the airplane is not a dangerous instrumentality. 4 Assuming,
without acknowledging, the result to be socially desirable does not excuse
the conclusion. Results reached by courts should only be reached by processes
de jure. All other results are properly within the province of the legislature.

A. H. TOOTHMAN

LABOR LAW - ECONOMIC PRESSURE IN THE CONTEXT
OF A REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
After the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, and during
the period of negotiations, the union utilized harassing tactics' to pressure
management into acceptance of a new contract on favorable terms. After
9. Grain Dealers Nat'l Mut.
Cir. 1951) (applying Florida law);
(1947); Atlantic Food Supply Co.
Blanford v. Nourse, 120 So.2d 830

Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d 726 (5th
Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268
v. Massey, 152 Fla. 43, 10 So.2d 718 (1942);
(Fla. App. 1960). These cases trace the genesis

and summation of the Florida automobile dangerous instrumentality doctrine and its

initial extension to the airplane.

10. Ibid; ALPERT, FLORIDA AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LAW 110-40 (1958).
11. Tiedt v. Gibbons, 1939 U.S. Av. 63 (Cook County Ct., I1. 1937); State
v. Henson Flying Service, 191 Md. 240, 60 A.2d 675 (1948); Davies v. Oshkosh
Airport, Inc., 214 Wis. 236, 252 N.W. 602 (1934).
12. Kadylak v. O'Brien, 32 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Pa. 1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§ 520 (1938).
13. Proper classification as ultrahazardous or as a dangerous instrumentality requires
that the object not be in common usage and that it involves risk of harm which cannot
be removed with utmost care. Neither of these conditions is presently fulfilled by
the airplane. RESTATEMENT, TORTS , 520 (1938).

14. Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal. App.2d 102, 111, 229 P.2d 114,
120 (1951): "It is true that the law formerly looked upon aviation as an ultrahazardous
activity. . . . However, this view has come to be modified and now . . an airplane
is not an inherently dangerous instrument." Accidents involving colliding airplanes
should be carefully segregated from accidents involving an airplane with ground objects.
The latter group fundamentally sounds in trespass. See, Eubank, Land Damage Liability
in Aircraft Cases, 57 DICK. L. REV. 188 (1953); Vold, Strict Liability for Aircraft
Crashes and Forced Landings on Ground Victims Outside of Established Landing
Areas, 5 HASTINCs L.J. 1 (1953).
1. This consisted of various on-the-job activities which were initiated subsequent
to the expiration of the old contract and entailed the following: refusal to solicit new
business; refusal to comply with company reporting procedures; refusal to participate in
the "May Policyholders' Month Campaign"; reporting late at the district offices;
refusal to perform customary office duties; refusal to be present at special business
conferences; picketing and distributing leaflets to policyholders; soliciting policyholders'
signatures on petitions; and presenting these petitions to the company while engaging
in mass demonstrations.
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several months of bargaining, an agreement was finally consumated. Management, however, charged the union with a violation of section 8(b) (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act.2 The National Labor Relations Board
held that the union's conduct constituted a refusal to bargain.3 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied the Board's petition
for enforcement of its order.4 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, Held,
affirmed: the use of economic pressure is not antithetic to "good faith"
bargaining; the Board cannot base a refusal to bargain on the mere
circumstance of conduct constituting an exertion of economic pressure.
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
Prior to the decision in the instant case, the NLRB had found both
management and labor guilty of bargaining in "bad faith"' when they
exerted economic pressure during collective bargaining negotiations. 6 The
elements that comprise economic pressure are not subject to definitive
explanation, but depend on the factual circumstances of the individual
case.7 Labor has been found by the Board to have employed economic
pressure in the context of an 8(b)(3) violation when it engaged in
strikes in violation of an existing agreement, 8 slowdowns, 9 and harassing
tactics during bargaining negotiations. 10 Management's adhibition of econo2. Section 8(b) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act provides: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees ...
"
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) as amended by the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (3), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)
(3) (1958).
3. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957).
4. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This case is
commonly referred to as the Prudential case.
5. Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act defines collective bargaining and requires
that the parties bargain in "good faith." "For the purposes of this section, to bargain
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and conditions of employment ..
" (Emphasis added.)
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) as amended by the Labor Manaaement
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1958). This section was passed in 1947 and embodies the prior determinations of the
courts that the duty to bargain requires "good faith" negotiations. See cases collected
at 29 U.S.C.A. § 158, n.268 (1956).
6. Amalgamated Lithographers of America, 124 N.L.R.B. 298 (1959); Quaker
State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958); Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119
N.L.R.B. 768 (1957); International Union, UMW, 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), set
aside, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Textile Workers Union of America, 108 N.L.R.B.
743 (1954), set aside, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
7. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 505 (1960) (separate
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter) "It [the Board] must proceed in terms of specific
conduct which it weighs as a more or less reliable manifestation of the state of mind
with which bargaining is conducted. No conduct in the complex context of bargaining
for a labor agreement can profitably be reduced to such an abstraction as 'economic
pressure'."
8. International Union, UMW, 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957).
9. Amalgamated Lithographers of America, 124 N.L.R.B. 298 (1959) (stated
refusal to work overtime).
10. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union. 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957) (see note I supra);
Textile Workers Union of America, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954) (organized refusal to work
overtime, an unauthorized extension of rest periods, directing employees to refuse to
work special hours, unannounced walkouts).
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mic pressure has consisted of closing some of its facilities after threatening
a lockout, shortening its work week during collective bargaining negotiations" and engaging in a partial or a complete lockout. 12 The Board
seemingly would allow management to exert economic pressure as a
14
defensive13 measure.
The prohibition of economic weapons by the Board is based on its
belief that the National Labor Relations Act' requires "reasoned discussion
in a background of balanced bargaining relations.

.

.

."0

The Board

rationalizes its regulation of economic pressures as a necessary corollary
to the accomplishment of this objective.
In the Federal Courts of Appeals the use of economic pressure has
been considered in accord with "good faith" bargaining contrary to the
determinations of the NLRB. 1 7 As early as 1942, the Sixth Circuit stated
that "the parties to labor controversies are left free under the act to
use their own economic strength in all lawful ways to obtain their
respective advantages."' 8 In the Personal Products case,' 9 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the use of harassing tactics
by a union was an exertion of economic pressure and that there was not
"the slightest inconsistency between a genuine desire to come to an agreement and use of economic pressure to get the kind of agreement one
wants." 20 The ratio decidendi of the court was that Congress never intended

11. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958).
12. Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 974 (1959). The Supreme
Court has stated that "the unqualified use of the term lock-out in several sections of
the Taft-Hartley Act is statutory recognition that there are circumstances in which
employers may lawfully resort to the lock-out as an economic weapon." (Emphasis
added.) NLRB v. Truck Drivers' Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 92 (1957).
13. A defensive measure would be activity on the part of one party in retaliation
to the other party's acts, i.e., a lockout by an employer in the face of a threatened
strike by a union.
14. Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 974 (1959). The use
of economic pressure as a defensive measure was approved by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Truck Drivers' Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957), decided prior to the Great
Falls Employers' case. However, management in Truck Drivers' Local 449 was not
charged with a refusal to bargain, but rather of violating other sections of the NLRA.
Therefore the decision cannot be used as a premise upon which to base a conclusion
that such pressure was considered in conformity with "good faith" bargaining. See also,
24 NLRB ANN. REP. 66 (1959); American Brake Shoe Co. v. NLRB, 244 F.2d
489 (7th Cir. 1957).
15. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1958).
16. Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360, 368 (1952). See also
the Board's reasoning in Textile Workers Union of America, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954);
23 NLRB ANN. REP. 89 (1958).
17. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
International Union, UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Textile
Workers Union of America v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409, (D.C. Cir. 1955).
18. NLRB v. Knoxville Publishing Co., 124 F.2d 875, 881 (6th Cir. 1942).
The court, however, did find management guilty of a refusal to bargain on the circumstances involved in this particular case.
19. Textile Workers Union of America v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
20. Id. at 410.
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the Board to regulate such conduct. 2t In a later case,2 2 the same court
stated obiter that a strike during negotiations in violation of an existing
23
collective bargaining agreement did not constitute a refusal to bargain.
The Courts of Appeals have rejected the Board's contention that the
regulation of economic weapons is necessary to implement congressional
24
intent under section 8(b) (3) of the NLRA.
The Supreme Court, prior to the decision in the Pndential case,
had not determined the effect of economic pressure on the duty to
bargain in "good faith. 2-71 The Court had held, however, that the Board
could not declare a particular act as a per se refusal to bargain. 26 The
entire factual pattern has to be considered in order to ascertain the
27
subjective intent of a party engaged in collective bargaining negotiations.
In the instant case, the Court could have reversed the Board on the basis
of this doctrine alone. However, it chose to go further. The Court
reasoned that Congress never intended the act to control the substantive
terms of a collective bargaining agreement. By allowing the Board to
regulate the economic pressures used by either party, in effect, the Board
would be substantially controlling these terms. 28 Thus, the use of economic
pressure was not inconsistent 'with "good faith" bargaining.29 The act
requires "good faith" collective bargaining and permits the use of economic
weapons during bargaining negotiations. The Court did not preclude the
Board from considering economic pressure as one aspect of the totality
of bargaining conduct.30 Thus, the Board in determining the subjective
"good faith" of the parties may take into consideration the exercise of
economic pressures."a The Court did hold that economic pressure alone
21. The court reasoned that on the basis of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the NLRA in International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 245 (1949), regulation of this type of conduct was not within the
Board's domain.
22. International Union, UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
23. The court's rationale was that Congress intended that the courts rather than

the Board should enforce collective bargaining agreements. International Union, UMWV
v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211, 214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
24. See note 2 supra.
25. The Supreme Court had held that a unilateral wage increase by an employer
during collective negotiations, where the employer failed to notify the union of the
action lie was taking and the wage increase was greater than any lie had been

willing to discuss with the union, constituted a refusal to bargain. NLRB v. CromptonHighland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949). For the Board's view on unilateral
actions by an employer see: 17 NLRB ANN. REP. 168 (1952); 16 NLRB ANN. REP.
199 (1951); 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 122 (1950).
26. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
27. Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion in the Prudential case is in accord with
this view. His test for determining whether a party has bargained in good faith would
be based on the totality of conduct. Included within this totality is any exertion
of economic pressure as well as other relevant conduct that should be considered.
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 508 (1960).
28. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
29. Id.at 490-91.
30. Id. at 498-99.
31. For varying views on this point see: Note, 62 W. VA. L. REV. 410 (1960);
Note, 28 CEO. WASI. L. REV. 924 (1960).
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could not be considered "bad faith. '32 Of course, where particular economic
conduct is specifically prohibited by the act, it is, of itself, a violation.38
The decision in the Prudential case is an emphatic denial of the
Board's power to regulate economic weapons during collective bargaining
in the context of an 8(b) (3) violation. The attempted regulation of these
weapons by the Board placed it in a position of controlling the substantive
terms of any resultant collective bargaining contract. 34 Congress did not
intend such a result.3 5 Although the writer wishes to express no opinion
as to whether this will have beneficial effect on national labor relations,
it is submitted that the decision is an implementation of congressional
intent as expressed in the current act. Whether the use of economic weapons
will be extended to the area of section 8(a) (5)36 was not determined.
If congressional intent is to be fully implemented, it certainly should.3 7
HERBERT ODELL

32. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 494-95 (1960).
33. Id. at 498-99.
34. See, Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958);
Delony, Good Faith in Collective Bargaining, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 378 (1959).
35. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1960).
36. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees ..
" (Emphasis added.) National
Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(5), 49 Stat. 452-53 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958).
37. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, 31 (1947).

